

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	C/C		15 JUN 1966
2			
3	C/R A		8 JUL 1966
4			
5			
6			
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
<b>Remarks:</b> All data in the captured German docs, as they concern persons who are mentioned in overt materials, are input and appear in the printout. The papers mentioned in the attached memo concern departmental records of US Gov't agencies, primarily the Dep't of State, held at National Archives.			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
C/R A/E			15 June 66
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	

FORM NO. 237  
1 APR 55

Replaces Form 30-4  
which may be used.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1955 - O - 342531

MEMORANDUM FOR: [ ]

you'll recall [ ]'s questions - this completes the action.

✓

P / per [ ]

Please return to me for filing. File Murillo, [ ]

25 July 66  
(DATE)

(47)

REPLACES FORM 10-101  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
 SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828  
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
 DATE 2007

☐ UNCLASSIFIED☐ INTERNAL  
USE ONLY☐ CONFIDENTIAL☒ SECRET

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: CI/R&A/ ☐  
2-C-29 Headquarters  
X6748

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

6 June 1966

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. C/CI/R&amp;A

✓

R

2.

3. e/ci

9 JUN 1966

9 JUN 1966

✓

4. C/CI/R&amp;A

2

W

5.

6. ☐ 1  
L 2

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

Jim,  
This memo, <sup>by E</sup> speaks  
to a point noted by  
John after a recent talk  
with you - see # I (b) of  
3 memos attached.

Returns to C/CI R&A  
3 to C/RTA/ ☐  
1. Re 2 (c) - are these  
German captured docs? No. they  
are not  
2. If so, what allied  
countries do not have  
access?  
3. Is there any restriction  
to the sending of info from you  
the para 2 (c) category to  
other security services in the  
normal course of business?

Jr.

**SECRET**

6 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Input of Data in Records Held at National Archives

REFERENCE: Memorandum for the Record, dated 2 June 1966;  
subject: OVERT Printout for Liaison; signed by  
L J

1. Paragraph I (b) of reference states that C/CI expressed his regret that material from the National Archives had been excluded from the printout; he also noted that this decision had not been submitted for his approval.


2. In this connection the following basic information should be noted concerning documents held at National Archives:

a. The records from which we will be inputting belong to the Department of State. We have been given access to all diplomatic records through 1944 by the Historical Division of the Department.

b. The records through 1933 are "open" and available to the public. There is no reason for exclusion of these data from the printout.

c. The records from 1934 through 1944 are "closed" and are not available to the public, except to selected scholars who must obtain permission from the Department. The data in this collection are rigidly controlled even to the point that scholars must submit their rough notes for clearance by the Department. Including these data in the printout would not only violate the spirit with which the Department granted us access, but it could also prove embarrassing to the United States. Also, release to other U.S. agencies would constitute a violation of the third-agency rule.

**SECRET**



SECRET


d. Some of the records in the "closed" as well as in the "open" collections carry a security classification, usually confidential. Such documents are not released to the public, even if they are a part of the "open" collection. Here too, exclusion from the printout would seem warranted, unless special dispensation is obtained from the Department.

e. Finally, much valuable biographic and other data are available in the old visa files of the Department. Of particular importance in this collection is the separate, complete set of visa files on Amtorg personnel through 1944. These files are not at all available to the public and hence the Department's approval for release of the data should be obtained.

3. At the time of the printout we had input only one Department of State document; therefore we have really not excluded anything. Since then we have begun input of Amtorg visa files; as of about 1 July 1966 we will be doing collateral name tracing and inputting data from pertinent diplomatic records.

4. I would suggest that we defer the decision concerning release of Department of State data until I have an opportunity to do some informal feeling-out of the two elements concerned, the Visa Office and the Historical Office. Surely there would be no objection to release of data in the "open" collection. But the fact that we checked with the Department would show that we live within the spirit in which access was granted.

SECRET



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CI STAFF USE ONLY

2 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: OVERT Printout for Liaison

On 1 June 1966, C/CI discussed the overt printout with  
CI/MRO, in considerable detail.

I. Present printout.

(a) C/CI viewed the present printout as suffering from a major flaw in that "mixed" personality summaries (those containing both overt and covert information) did not appear. He noted that users would expect summaries on persons who were included in the books which had been input.

(b) C/CI expressed his regret that material from the National Archives had been excluded, and noted that this decision had not been submitted for his approval. ✓

(c) The completed 22 sets were sufficient at present, but more might be required. (It was noted that some lead time would be required in order to schedule further time on the IBM 360/printer).

(d) C/CI had not yet decided on just what dissemination to give the printout.

(e) Some sets of the printout would be delivered outside of normal pouch channels. As for those going via pouch, transmittal could be in pieces, with one volume at a time if necessary.

(f) The information contained in the printout was unclassified, while the program itself had been exposed to so many liaison services that it no longer required the protection of a high security classification.

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CI STAFF USE ONLY

(g) C/CI stated that he would prepare the covering memorandums for liaison services, the CSCI's for other USG components, and the dispatches for the field stations.

(h) C/CI noted that he had pretty clear ideas on what he expected from this exercise, but invited CI/MRO to submit any ideas which he might have.

**II. Future plans.**

(a) C/CI instructed CI/MRO to work out with C/CI/R&A a realistic date by which the programming should be completed for separation of "mixed" records.

(b) At the same time a date should be set for the next dissemination to the community.

(c) C/CI heard all the arguments in support of using aperture cards for future disseminations, but rejected them on the grounds that the users wouldn't want aperture cards, and that it would be impossible for users to make marginal notes unless they had hard copy.

(d) If the time came when the overt machine program required a formal program, CI/MRO should prepare one, but it seemed better not to raise the matter.

(e) C/CI was asked for his views on a separate tape for the overt listing, but preferred not to discuss this aspect of the program at present.

Orig - C/CI/R&A

1 - CI/R&A - [ ]

1 - CI/R&A - [ ]

1 - CI/R&A - [ ]

1 - CI/R&A, [ ]

1 - CI/R&A/Chrono

**SECRET**